On The Concept of 'Bad Music'

Discuss, using a range of musical examples, in relation to ideas around musical taste.

The concept of ‘bad music’ has fascinated musicologists, philosophers, and sociologists alike, and the idea of such musical judgment has often raised questions on its legitimacy. When a person points out that some music is ‘bad,’ what do they mean? Before addressing whether or not music can be ‘bad,’ it would be helpful to first examine ‘music’ in this context. According to Christopher Small’s abstract definition of the art of music making, or in his words, ‘musicking’ (1998, 12), ‘Music is not a thing at all but an activity, something that people do.’ Some others may point out that Music is an aesthetic art of sound, and perhaps with composers’ growing interest in raw sounds, non-tonal and noise elements are also included (Hamilton 2007, 40–41). Since there is hardly any consensus among musicologists, scholars, and philosophers as to what music actually is, judging some as ‘bad’ may straight away seem counterintuitive. Perhaps this is why Frith dismisses it and categorises ‘bad’ music as simply a subjective evaluation (2007, 317). However, before we completely rule out the existence of such ‘bad music’ as something purely subjective in such contexts, I would like to discuss different ideas that people might have when they say music is ‘bad,’ from subjective evaluations to possibly an objective assessment of all forms of music – performances, sheet music, and compositions alike; just as people can describe food as ‘bad’ because they dislike it or because it is unhealthy, so too might music be judged in multiple ways. Besides, Frith has little to say about ‘bad music’ in a classical context. Since I am primarily classically trained and literate, I will evaluate whether his point holds in technical, contextual, and moral dimensions by drawing examples primarily from classical music, while also using them to illuminate the broader question of taste and evaluation. I will also explain how I believe there is ‘bad music,’ but this idea of ‘bad music’ may not be as concrete as we might think.

To understand how music can be perceived as ‘bad,’ we should first evaluate the different ideas of musical quality and value over the years, from objective virtue to social construction. In early music, Western composers were usually devout Christians who wrote for their churches and the glory of God. Church figures like Augustine often described music as a divine harmony (quoted in MacInnis 2015, 212), which provided the moral framework for ‘good’ music, whether in the composition itself or in the performance, allowing musical judgments to transcend morality into order and spirituality. For instance, Bach wrote numerous religious cantatas (Terry 1920), and Handel’s Messiah sets themes about Christ into music, remaining a staple in religious music today (Burrows 1991, vii, 1). It was not until the Enlightenment that ideas about the purpose of music shifted away from religious morality toward secularisation, emphasising reason and autonomy and reframing artistic evaluation in the process (McAuley 2020, 195). Music is no longer ‘good’ because it is morally uplifting, but is instead ‘beautiful’ when it produces a disinterested pleasure. In his Critique of Judgment, Kant explains that a pure judgment of taste is only concerned with the form of its purposiveness (1987, 45–46). Hanslick, in his On the Musically Beautiful, argues that feeling is secondary in effect (1986, 5). This reflects the core of Enlightenment formalism, which shifts from an interested liking of music focusing on moral aims to a disinterested liking of aesthetic contemplation.

In response to the formalist focus on disinterested beauty, 20th-century sociology reframed taste and value as socially constructed, culturally defined, and tied to identity and taste cultures. Frith’s argument is closely linked to this idea of a sociological framework dictating taste (2007, 318), in which he expresses that ‘bad music’ is a sign of the institutions or behaviour of society (Ibid.). This is similar to how we understand taste in terms of food – while some food can be ‘bad for health’ (objective), others are ‘bad to taste’ (subjective), and the same applies to music. This has been the historical evolution of musical value, in which different eras may subsequently define ‘bad music’ differently.

Since the definition of ‘bad music’ shifts over time, is there an objective or technical ‘badness’ that is eternally true? Can music be bad on purely technical or aesthetic grounds? Frith outlines this by arguing that by saying some music is ‘bad,’ a set of technical judgments on the music-making process is usually already in place, such as musicians playing the wrong notes, the wrong chords, or the wrong tempo, thus raising an essential question about the relationship between ‘wrongness’ and ‘badness’ (2007, 317).

In music theory, we know that a particular chord may sound more pleasant when the frequencies of the notes harmonise. On the contrary, when chords do not follow the natural technicality that we expect them to do, and sound unpleasant at first listen, does that mean those chords are automatically ‘wrong’? As discussed earlier, Hanslick argues that music is judged by its internal coherence and craft (1986, 5). Can that slight unpleasantness carry meaning in the music, thus deliberately serving a purpose?

According to Adorno in his ‘Philosophy of New Music’ (2006, 44), traditional music was structured with a strict number of tonal combinations, as opposed to contemporary music today, where chords are assigned to whatever the composer sees fit. Nothing compels the composer to stick to the traditional, universal rules of tonality, suggesting that technical norms themselves shift as well. If it is no longer ‘wrong’ to not adhere to the technical features of tonal music, then it is certainly not ‘bad’ inherently. Although I have every reason to believe that the masses would prefer the traditional neatness of structured music that harmonises and is pleasant to the ear, judgments on the internal coherence of music are somewhat subjective – one may very much enjoy the clashes and ‘weird’ progressions of certain chords and melodies, just because it feels fresh and alien.

Now consider some music perceived as shallow, with little technical depth – some would say minimalist music, as such. However, does its structural repetitiveness automatically render it ‘bad’? Others would argue that minimalism challenges us to engage with music differently, not necessarily through the same lens of classical music (BBC Music 2016). Contrast that with once-controversial music, such as Stravinsky’s The Rite of Spring, which famously sparked a riot at its premiere because of its dissonant chords and rhythmic irregularity initially heard as technical ‘wrongness’ (Windhausen 2023). Some would argue that it is categorically wrong and therefore ‘bad’ because it was contrary to what elegant music in a ballet should be. However, others would regard such work as revolutionary and daring. Just as some innovations in cooking, such as fusion food, were once rejected (Finney 2020), so too was dissonance harmony in this case; and even technical standards in food and music alike depend on cultural training and expectations.

Hereby, Frith presents his view on musical judgment – that most judgments of bad music are, at the same time, their explanations (2007, 317–318). Can we therefore explain with certainty that some music is ‘bad’? Does this explanation hold any value to the perception of the music? Is this perception of its value an indisputable, objective truth? Although we could technically explain how a particular note or chord is ‘wrong’ in context, it is perhaps not a universal truth that that particular note is ‘always wrong,’ and therefore ‘bad.’ A classic example would be the tritone, viewed as evil (diabolus in musica) and therefore ‘bad’ in the very early stages of music (Drabkin 2001), but soon widely used as a leading interval for the perfect cadence (Ibid.). As expectations shift over time, so does people’s tolerance for new and daring musical ideas; hence, it does not automatically render them ‘bad’ in an objective sense.

Since we know that ideas of an ‘objective’ or ‘technical’ badness are inconsistent, debated, and shift over time, this neatly brings us to the question of how value judgments are subjective, arising not only from the craft but also from a socially constructed context, taste, and positioning. Frith argues that the explanations of badness are fundamentally tied to sociological contexts (2007, 318). For example, music listeners sometimes dismiss a record or artist for sounding just like someone else, which also fuels different attitudes toward ‘covers’ of songs (Ibid.). When listeners reject a song or artist for ‘sounding just like someone else,’ the judgment has nothing to do with the technical craft. However, people still call it ‘bad’ because they judge the value of music also by its originality, authenticity, or even identity, all of which are socially constructed expectations rather than objective technical standards. In genres like improvisational jazz or indie, where authenticity or uniqueness is prized, imitation becomes a cultural fault rather than a musical mistake.

Besides, sociologists like Howard Becker also show that conventions in art, including stylistic and presentation norms, expectations of skill or genre boundaries, are socially constructed and historically variable (2008, 41). Our sense of musical judgment becomes context-dependent – something can be collectively labelled ‘bad’ not necessarily because of an objective ‘badness,’ but simply due to violations of musical conventions of a particular society (Ibid.). At the same time, reputations are another socially organised mechanism shaping judgments, and he outlines that distributors and audiences take reputations (that is, constructed taste) into account when deciding what to support emotionally (2008, 131). He argues that these aesthetic claims and/or reputations appear universal because of shared art-world activities, such as training experiences and socially learned tastes, under the hood (2008, 131–132).

These socially embedded expectations shape not only everyday taste but also the historical reception of musical works. If we look again at the controversy surrounding the premiere of Stravinsky’s The Rite of Spring, the riot was unleashed not only by its unconventional tonality and complex rhythm, but also by breaking stylistic norms and audience expectations for elegant ballet (Windhausen 2023). Contrast that with its reception today, which came to be understood differently as a classic that influenced the development of 20th-century classical music (Willsher 2013), once cultural expectations shifted. The same applies to 20th-century Serialism, which was once dismissed by some as unmusical but later became dominant in post-war contemporary ‘classical’ styles (Whittall 2023, 38–39). This phenomenon of contextual ‘badness’ being socially constructed has striking parallels with ‘acquired taste’ in foods such as coffee or strong cheese, which grows on people over time, mirroring how dissonant or unconventional music can move from initial repulsion to later appreciation.

In addition to evaluating value judgments based on objectivity and context, moral evaluations also come into play. Historically, this has included accusations that some music is vulgar, decadent, and politically polarising. We explored how early Western society saw music as a virtue, with early sacred music deemed ‘good’ for its moral intent of glorifying God. However, moralised judgments have shifted, though they persist today. Contrast early virtuous music with contemporary controversies around lyrics perceived as promoting immoral values, violence, or sexuality. For example, in his Running with the Devil (1993, 1), Walser emphasised the interconnections of ‘heavy metal’ music with literal toxic chemicals, claiming that such music was linked with danger and unpleasantness, thus invoking blasphemy or immoral signifiers (1993, 2). A more recent example is Lady Gaga’s ‘Abracadabra,’ which received mixed reception from fans and critics alike; some even condemned it, accusing it of incorporating spells and witchcraft in the chorus (u/lanaspeachlipgloss 2025). Despite the negative comments not stemming from a thorough academic analysis, it is nonetheless interesting to examine listeners' mixed opinions. These moral evaluations are hence value-laden, not a technical criterion for judging musical taste, but are equally valid, as they are obviously existential.

Social evaluations are also prevalent in such value judgments, in which ‘badness’ has to do with the framework of ‘depth’ – often sparking debates between classical die-hards and fans of popular music. Classical music listeners often characterise popular music as ‘shallow’ with a lack of depth – a repetition of basic chords and structure, commercialised and formulaic for the masses (Frith 2007, 318), yet lacking in flexibility and sentiment at the compositional level. In contrast, pop music fans would accuse classical music of being boring and aristocratic, complex, and difficult to understand. These opposing claims reveal that value judgments ultimately boil down to preference and to different evaluative frameworks arising from identity, cultural capital, and values about what music ought to be.

After evaluating the technical, subjective, contextual, moral, and social elements of value judgments, we have little reason to believe there is a fixed definition of ‘bad music.’ Therefore, Frith is neither entirely right nor wrong – his argument holds insofar as badness is constructed, but perhaps overlooks the dependence of judgments on technical norms, moral codes, and cultural positions. ‘Taste,’ whether in food or music, is a fundamental expression of a set of values, which can be unique to the individual. Besides, just as food tastes change across cultures and eras, musical tastes evolve, and what is ‘bad’ today may be ‘acquired’ tomorrow. Hence, ‘bad music’ can exist within specific frameworks, has influenced our value judgments, and continues to spark debates among musicologists, philosophers, and sociologists alike. Nevertheless, its definition is more ambiguous than we think, and does not reveal a universal truth. Perhaps the search for ‘bad’ music tells us more about society and ourselves than the music itself.

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